
3.6

“WHAT IS NEEDED IS THE MORTAR THAT HOLDS THESE BLOCKS TOGETHER”: COORDINATING LOCAL SERVICES THROUGH COMMUNITY-BASED MANAGERIALISM

Josh EVANS & Robert WILTON

INTRODUCTION

Historically speaking, responses to homelessness in Canada have been formed most directly at the local level, most often led by faith-based, volunteer-driven charitable organizations with long histories of serving low-income and unhoused individuals and families. These local and informal voluntary landscapes typically provided basic stopgap services such as emergency shelter and meal programs to homeless populations. Until the late 1980s, these voluntary landscapes operated largely outside the purview of provincial and federal governments (Wolfe & Jay, 1993); however, during the 1990s, as housing crises worsened and shelters became overburdened by a growing and increasingly diverse homeless population and as funding regimes evolved, these voluntary landscapes of care underwent a significant re-configuration shifting from a ‘patchwork’ of crisis-relief programs largely operating in isolation to a more ‘seamless’ network of outcome-orientated programs focused on moving individuals from the street to the shelter and into independent housing. An emergent priority in this re-configured system has been both increased inter-agency coordination and the targeting of services to chronically homeless individuals with complex needs

living in the shelter system. In addition, this re-configuration has relied upon collaborative planning and local partnerships between local government and voluntary organizations.

In this chapter, we use a case study to conceptualize this form of local coordination, a form of governance we call community-based managerialism (CBM), and assess its impacts on the local voluntary sector. Our case study is based on research that chronicled how local actors (municipal officials, voluntary sector organizations) responded to the burgeoning crisis of homelessness in Hamilton, Ontario between 1999 and 2009. The research combined a number of qualitative methods, including interviews and document analysis, to gather multiple perspectives on the experience of homeless people, the experiences of government and voluntary sector actors involved in service provision and the evolution of social policies aimed at addressing homelessness in the city.

We use this case study to argue that efforts to coordinate local services proceeded through the scaffolding of ‘soft’ community arrangements over top ‘hard’ managerial arrangements (a form of governance we term

CBM) which more effectively focused services on the chronically homeless but also reconfigured the local voluntary landscape. Here we understand soft arrangements to refer to horizontal networks of collaborative decision making, social partnership and coordinated service delivery and hard arrangements to refer to linear top-down decision making, performance management and contractually organized service delivery (Craig & Cotterell, 2007).

In what follows we first review relevant literatures on state/voluntary sector relations and define some of the terminology used in this chapter. We then turn our attention to the coordination of homelessness services in Ontario before examining the Hamilton experience in more detail. This is followed by some concluding reflections on the governance of community services for homeless people through community-based managerialism.

INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, STATE/VOLUNTARY SECTOR RELATIONSHIPS AND THE VOLUNTARY LANDSCAPE

The voluntary sector has played a key role in responding to the crisis of homelessness in Canada. Generally speaking, the 'voluntary sector' refers to a collection of independent, self-governing, non-profit organizations that are constitutionally independent of the state but which often work closely with the public sector and for the public good. The neoliberal restructuring of welfare states in countries such as Canada has assigned more formal responsibility to the voluntary sector for the delivery of public services (Evans & Shields, 2001). In the process, voluntary sector organizations have developed closer relationships with the state, relationships shaped through various institutional arrangements joining the voluntary sector to the state. In this chapter, we consider two types of arrangements: hard managerial arrangements and soft community arrangements (Craig & Cotterell, 2007). Each of these arrangements has featured in scholarly literatures on the voluntary sector. Each has also been associated with a particular type of voluntary landscape: the shadow state and the partnering state, respectively. These literatures are reviewed next.

The neoliberal restructuring of welfare states in countries such as Canada has assigned more formal responsibility to the voluntary sector for the delivery of public services (Evans & Shields, 2001)

Hard Arrangements and the Shadow State

Hard arrangements pertain to public management reforms in the early 1990s marked by the proliferation of contractual relationships, accountability controls and performance measures that accompanied privatization strategies in the neoliberal era (Craig & Cotterell, 2007). This form of public administration has been labeled the New Public Management (NPM) (Clarke & Newman, 1997). Craig and Cotterell (2007) label these arrangements hard because they facilitate, in a hierarchical fashion, the bureaucratic and administrative control of welfare services and, by extension, local voluntary organizations.

One of the primary administrative devices of NPM is contracting between the state and voluntary sector organizations for public services. The shift towards NPM strategies in the 1980s and early 1990s ushered in a 'contractual regime' consisting of purchaser-provider splits between the state and the voluntary sector (Smith & Lipsky, 1993). An important element of this 'contract culture' has been the creation of quasi-markets through 'managed competition' (e.g. state-coordinated competitive bidding processes) among voluntary sector organizations for service contracts (Cloutier-Fisher & Skinner, 2006). Principles of accountability and efficiency have also guided NPM strategies manifesting as output-orientated and target-based measures of performance and accountability that are pegged to the contractual regime (Clarke & Newman, 1997).

Literature in the social sciences (e.g. Baines, 2004; Gibson et al., 2007; Phillips & Levasseur, 2004; Shields & Evans, 1998; Smith & Lipsky, 1993) and human geography in particular (e.g. Cloutier-Fisher & Skinner, 2006; Milligan & Conradson, 2006; Skinner & Rosenberg, 2006; Trudeau, 2008b) have examined the impacts of NPM reforms on the voluntary sector. On the whole this literature has shown how the ethos and structure of voluntary sector organizations changed as nonprofits are required to function more like entrepreneurs and 'do more for less' (Evans & Shields, 2001). By providing incentives for professional skills and training, competitive bidding processes have encouraged professionalization (Smith & Lipsky 1993). In many cases this has altered the types of services voluntary sector organizations deliver. As a result, many nonprofits have evolved from small grassroots organizations to large bureaucratic, corporatist organizations (Milligan & Fyfe, 2005).

By providing incentives for professional skills and training, competitive bidding processes have encouraged professionalization (Smith & Lipsky 1993).

Many of these themes are captured in the shadow state concept developed by Jennifer Wolch (1989, 1990). Wolch coined the shadow state concept, in the context of welfare state devolution and privatization in the 1980s, to describe a quasi-state apparatus created through the contracting of voluntary sector organizations by the state for public service delivery (see DeVerteuil et al., 2002; Lake & Newman, 2002; Mitchell, 2001; Trudeau, 2008a). This shadow state apparatus is bureaucratically administered in a hierarchical fashion outside of democratic oversight. As this apparatus develops, the voluntary sector becomes increasingly dependent on state funding and in turn is subject to increased administrative control by the state. As a result the expansion of the shadow state apparatus facilitates the penetration of the state further into civil society and, by extension, into communities and the everyday lives of service users.

Soft Arrangements and the Partnering State

In the more recent period, new soft arrangements that emphasize “the strategic importance of civil society for social cohesion and economic vitality” (Fyfe, 2005: 539) have emerged. Rather than focus on transforming the voluntary sector into a market and nonprofits into entrepreneurial actors as NPM reforms aimed to do, soft arrangements seek to use voluntary organizations as instruments to reinvigorate civil society (Fyfe, 2005) by promoting community collaboration and partnership and fostering social capital and active citizenship (Milligan & Fyfe, 2005). Soft arrangements have typically been associated with local grassroots participation and a shift towards ‘networked’ and ‘horizontal’ forms of coordination (Phillips, 2004; Saint-Martin, 2004). Craig and Cotterell (2007) label these forms of coordination soft because they are premised on partnership, collaboration and interdependence as opposed to hierarchical command and control principles.

These soft arrangements have generated a stream of recent literature on voluntary sector experiences (e.g. Fyfe, 2005; Milligan & Conradson, 2006; Milligan & Fyfe, 2005; Trudeau, 2008a, 2008b). This research has re-examined voluntarism in the context of the repositioning of voluntary sector organizations from simple delivery agents to partners in a community governance paradigm (Edwards & Woods, 2006; Halseth & Ryser, 2007). These new spaces of governance have prompted some to rethink issues of cooptation and concepts such as the shadow state. Trudeau (2008a) has put forward the revised notion of a ‘relational shadow state’ which moves away from viewing voluntarism as the straightforward cooptation of voluntary sector organizations by state agendas and rationalities. Trudeau (2008a) instead directs attention to the multiple directionalities of influence and agenda setting that characterizes contemporary state-civil society relations. He argues that interactions between the state and civil society actors are better approached as relational in nature, reflecting the growing preference for soft institutional arrangements in social policy.

Much in the same vein, others have pointed to the notion of a partnering state (Larner & Craig, 2005; Larner & Butler, 2005). Central to the notion of the partnering state is what Larner and Butler (2005: 80) define as local partnerships: the “multi-level collaborative arrangements that aspire to ‘join up’ central government agencies, local institutions (e.g. local authorities, schools, hospitals) and/or community and voluntary sector groups.” According to Larner and Butler (2005, 2007) the partnering state cannot be read as a straightforward top-down cooptation of the voluntary sector by the paternalistic state (as portrayed by the shadow state concept). Instead, local partnerships are characterized by processes of contestation through which community agendas penetrate the state.

Some, however, have identified problems with the partnering state. Milligan and Fyfe (2005, 2006), for example, suggest that voluntary sector agencies are forced down two strategic pathways: one, embrace the renewed state-voluntary sector compacts and sacrifice traditional voluntary ideals and independence in exchange for partnership working and empowerment strategies (e.g. renewal) or, two, maintain independence to pursue traditional ideals by de-centering to the margins away from state partnerships and by extension funding (e.g. relocation). Milligan and Fyfe (2006) suggest that these divergent pathways have contributed to a bifurcated voluntary landscape consisting of large, professionalized, hierarchical corporatist organizations and small, informal, non-hierarchical ‘grassroots’ organizations (Milligan & Fyfe, 2005; Fyfe & Milligan, 2005). Others have raised questions regarding the degree to which the more recent emphasis on partnerships are only skin deep in the sense that they conveniently outflank problems such as homelessness, deepening neoliberal ideals and market rationalities in the process (Graefe, 2007; MacMillan & Townsend, 2006).

These questions concerning the nature of soft institutional arrangements and the ways in which they are layered onto other harder institutional arrangements have implications for how we interpret the governance of community services for homeless populations. In the following section, we use a case study of homelessness policy in Hamilton, Ontario to examine the implications of efforts to coordinate local services through a combination of hard *and* soft institutional arrangements, a mode of governance we call CBM. Our case study draws upon 20 key informant interviews with representatives of voluntary sector service providers and municipal government officials from Hamilton. Interviews were digitally recorded, transcribed and analyzed alongside relevant policy documents and materials.

These questions concerning the nature of soft institutional arrangements and the ways in which they are layered onto other harder institutional arrangements have implications for how we interpret the governance of community services for homeless populations.

THE GOVERNANCE OF HOMELESS SERVICES: THE ONTARIO CONTEXT

In Ontario, the intensification of homelessness in the late 1990s was profoundly shaped by cutbacks at the provincial level. From 1995–2002 Ontario was governed by an ultra-conservative political party that introduced a radical neoliberal policy agenda. These policies were particularly damaging to people living in poverty.

Provincial policies have had enormous impacts on levels of homelessness and service responses. In Ontario, the intensification of homelessness in the late 1990s was profoundly shaped by cutbacks at the provincial level. From 1995–2002 Ontario was governed by an ultra-conservative political party that introduced a radical neoliberal policy agenda. These policies were particularly damaging to people living in poverty. Almost immediately upon taking control of government, then provincial Premier Mike Harris cut social assistance rates by 21.9%, eliminated rent controls and cancelled the construction of 17,000 social housing units (Hulchanski, 2004). In addition to rolling back key aspects of the welfare state, the government also rolled out transformative institutional reforms. First, the government introduced the *Ontario Works Act (OWA)* (1997) which converted the province's welfare program to a U.S.-modeled workfare program (Peck, 2001). Second, the government forced the amalgamation of several municipalities and downloaded social welfare responsibilities in areas such as social and community health services. During this 'local services realignment,' as it came to be called, the provincial government retained significant responsibilities such as setting overall program objectives and standards. Provincial involvement in homeless services was limited to five programs at the time, two of which were cost-shared (80/20) between the province and municipalities. After the re-alignment, municipalities assumed responsibility (and the added cost-burden) for administering and delivering these programs.

The restructuring of the late 1990s had far-reaching implications with regard to the governance of homeless services at the local level. While roll-backs exacerbated poverty and increased demands for welfare assistance, downloading shifted more responsibility and cost-burdens for welfare services to municipalities. These shifts created an austere fiscal predicament for municipal governments. To cope with these responsibilities and rising demand for services, services such as emergency shelter provision were contracted to local voluntary sector organizations. These services were funded through 'purchase-of-service' contracts, a model originating in the early 1980s (Laws, 1992). These contracts compensated voluntary sector organizations with a per diem, the value of which was set by the province, for each night a person stays at the shelter. The cost of this per diem was cost-shared by the province and municipality (80-20 respectively). The *OWA* legislation sets the general rules regarding what was expected from shelter providers under these purchase-of-service contracts. For example, under the *OWA* service providers have provided shelter, food and basic supervision. Under this funding regime, voluntary sector portfolios rapidly expanded to meet the demand for emergency accommodation. Under the broad mandate of the *OWA*, service providers had the freedom to craft their own shelter programs and these largely followed their organizational philosophies and missions leading to organizational 'silos' as well as underserved populations.

In the decade that followed, this state-voluntary sector relationship was transformed again by provincial and federal programs that introduced a number of hard and soft arrangements. In 2002, the provincial government changed over to the Liberal party and new Premier Dalton McGuinty (2002–2013) initiated an explicit 'Third Way' political agenda (Coulter, 2009).

In 2002, the provincial government changed over to the Liberal party and new Premier Dalton McGuinty (2002–2013) initiated an explicit 'Third Way' political agenda (Coulter, 2009). McGuinty's policies reflected a more inclusive agenda and programs were routinely wrapped in the language of social investment.

McGuinty's policies reflected a more inclusive agenda and programs were routinely wrapped in the language of social investment. In 2005, the five provincial homeless programs that survived the Harris era were merged into the *Consolidated Homelessness Prevention Program* (CHPP). While funding levels remained unchanged, the program itself was more ambitious in terms of how it sought to coordinate services at the local level. CHPP aimed to: create seamless service continuums to reconnect individuals and families and assist those at risk of homelessness; promote innovative and flexible client-centred approaches to service delivery; provide support for planning and management activities such as research and the development of community plans; and track client outcomes and performance measures. Municipalities were required to report regularly on six performance measures such as the number of homeless individuals served and the number of homeless individuals moved from the street to temporary accommodation and then to permanent accommodation.

Nonetheless, much of the social policy and funding arrangements introduced under the previous government remained unchanged (e.g. elimination of rent controls, abandonment of social housing commitments, downloading of social service delivery).

The federal government, in introducing its own hard managerial and soft community arrangements, also played a significant role transforming state-voluntary sector relationships in Ontario. In the last decade, perhaps the most significant homeless program in Canada has been the federal government's *National Homelessness Initiative* (NHI), now called the *Homelessness Partnering Strategy* (HPS). Shortly after disentangling itself from the social housing sector in 1995, the federal government launched the three-year (2000–2003) NHI. The NHI was designed to assist local

communities in alleviating homelessness, which was widely perceived as a national crisis by the year 2000 (Graham et al., 2003). The underlying rationale of the NHI was to address the fragmented nature of community services at the local level. The NHI sought to promote a continuum of community-based supports by empowering local governments, community agencies and other partners to work collaboratively towards integrated strategies and community action plans.

The cornerstone of NHI was the Supporting Community Partnerships Initiative (SCPI). SCPI was conceived as a capacity-building program that would promote community-based partnerships among government, private and voluntary sectors and develop strategies to reduce street homelessness. These strategies were to be data driven and informed by tailored community plans. Investments were to be directed towards seamless and integrated service models that could be delivered in a collaborative manner. Decision making was carried out through a Community Entity (CE) model wherein a municipality or an incorporated body authorized to make decisions on behalf of the community makes project selection decisions. In light of the continued growth of homelessness, SCPI was later extended an additional three years (2003–2006). In 2006, the federal government changed hands from the Liberal Party of Canada to the Conservative Party of Canada. Initially the new Conservative government extended the SCPI program an additional year (2006–2007). The NHI and SCPI were then re-branded as the Homeless Partnering Strategy (HPS) and the Homeless Partnering Initiative (HPI) respectively. The HPI (2007–present) is similar to SCPI in its focus on community-based partnership. It differs, however, in its explicit adoption of a Housing First (HF) approach and a heavier emphasis on outcomes and performance management.

The HPI (2007–present) is similar to SCPI in its focus on community-based partnership. It differs, however, in its explicit adoption of a Housing First (HF) approach and a heavier emphasis on outcomes and performance management.

In summary, the governance of community services for homeless populations in Ontario has long been a local endeavor involving provincial and municipal governments and, most directly, voluntary sector organizations. Voluntary organizations have, until recently, operated rather autonomously under the vague prescriptions of the *OWA* and contractual terms defined by service agreements with the municipality. In recent years, however, provincial and federal homeless programs have encouraged the development of more seamless service systems delivered through soft community-based partnerships managed using hard performance evaluation tools. These latter programs have transformed the level and scope of service integration at the local level. The next section examines these transformations in more detail paying particular attention to the impacts on the voluntary sector, using Hamilton, Ontario as a case study.

COORDINATING THE LOCAL VOLUNTARY LANDSCAPE: COMMUNITY-BASED MANAGERIALISM IN HAMILTON, ONTARIO

Our case study is organized into three subsections. The first subsection describes the emergence of a managerial approach to homelessness structured by hard institutional arrangements. The second subsection describes the co-emergence of a complimentary and interlocking community approach to homelessness structured by soft institutional arrangements. The coexistence of these two forms of coordination constitutes a form of local governance we call CBM. The third subsection describes the impacts of CBM on the local voluntary sector.

The 'Managerial Turn'

In 1999, community services for homeless people in Hamilton, Ontario encompassed a network of emergency shelters operated by local voluntary sector organizations. Over the course of 10 years, the coordination of these services came to be reshaped by a 'managerial turn' towards outcome measurement and performance evaluation. The shift was rationalized in local policy documents and by local actors as a necessary response to the fragmented and crisis-orientated landscape of homelessness services, a landscape representing significant costs to the city and the province as poverty rose, housing affordability worsened and emergency shelters swelled (City of Hamilton, 2003, 2004, 2009). This encompassed a strategic shift away from disconnected program silos towards an integrated and proactive service system orientated around efficiency and sustainability. This emphasis on creating measurable and integrated service systems reflected the strategic focus of federal programs such as SCPI/HPI and Ontario's CHPP. Both programs required enumerating local homeless populations and tracking performance measures such as the number of homeless individuals served in shelters and moved into permanent accommodation. Both programs also emphasized the creation of integrated service systems.

By bringing local service providers together into a new service system city officials in Hamilton sought a more sustainable approach that could alleviate homelessness and address the rising costs associated with providing emergency shelter. Key components of this new system were funding mechanisms to reorient the shelter-based programs of independent voluntary agencies to move individuals out of the shelter system and into housing. As one Hamilton municipal official put it:

Funding agencies for folks in beds doesn't create an ability to move people out of the shelter system – which is where we want to get to, right? The shelters focus exclusively on that sort of emergency response when it's needed as opposed to longer-term housing, right (...) We want to, again, look at it from a system perspective and say, 'where's the best place to invest?' (Municipal Official 2)

Programs implemented to monitor and measure changes in service usage were instrumental in identifying the best place to invest. The SCPI/HPI programs were particularly significant here. A major initiative launched through SCPI was the Homelessness Individual and Family Information System (HIFIS). HIFIS was a

database tool that was installed in shelters to collect data on individuals using shelter services. It permitted city managers to track shelter usage by facility and individual over time. This new analytical capacity revealed that the chronically homeless comprised a small proportion of the sheltered population but accounted for a disproportionately large proportion of costs (Culhane & Metraux, 2008).

In 2007, approximately 90% of shelter users stayed in Hamilton facilities for less than 42 days. Approximately 10% stayed for longer than 42 days (City of Hamilton, 2007b). This smaller group, it was believed, consumed a far greater amount of resources and thus represented a greater cost to the city and province. By providing these groups with immediate housing through a HF approach significant cost savings could be achieved. Based on this logic, the targeting of chronically homeless populations became a priority for the city, as did the eventual shrinking of the emergency shelter system (City of Hamilton, 2009). The same municipal official remarked on these priorities:

So I think clearly we now have a vision of what our priorities are currently. We know the funding streams that we have. We are consciously, consciously – I mean on this level we are consciously – trying to ensure that we are using our money to meet those priorities.
(Municipal Official 2)

Funding streams from the federal government's NHI/HPI and the provincial government's CHPP were instrumental in pursuing these new priorities. Both provided an assortment of time-limited, project-based grants to the city that facilitated a significant redesign of the shelter system. Designs came to emphasize HF over shelter-first approaches going as far as recommending the planned shrinkage of emergency shelters and even the closing of some facilities. It also recognized the need to replace the per diem system

with base funding for agencies. In a city where shelter services were handled entirely by the voluntary sector this system redesign required community buy-in, a fact that was not lost on municipal officials:

I think there's a greater awareness of the need to look at a system of services rather than individual services or individual agencies, individual programs. There is still a lot of resistance to that because it does mean change. It could mean change in the way things are done. It could mean often there is a funding implication to changing the 'silo' approach or the program driven approach to a system of service and the impact could be significant for a particular agency (...)
So there is that gap that still has to be breached I think in terms of how do we deal with sort of the autonomy and the local missions of local agencies that may or may not fit in with realignments of resources from a systems approach.
(Municipal Official 1)

Getting agencies, which had historically operated independently, to buy into a shared service system represented a challenge, particularly because working together as a system involved not only changing the way that services were to be funded but also shrinking programs. The challenge for the city and province was to find ways to run a more efficient system while insuring space remained for the autonomy (and by extension diversity and innovation) of voluntary sector agencies.

The 'Community Turn'

As the local voluntary sector was being reshaped by a managerial turn towards performance evaluation and financial management, it was simultaneously being reshaped by a 'community turn' towards collaborative planning and partnership. This turn was symbolized by a long and sometimes contentious period of community consultation and collaborative planning that produced numerous assessments, action plans, community plans and strategic plans. In this regard, federal programs such as the NHI and the HPS were instrumental in facilitating this turn. They provided many of the resources (personnel and funds) required to coordinate collaborative community planning. This community turn placed municipalities in a better position to take ownership of the homelessness problem, as they had been delegated by the province, and formulate a 'made in Hamilton' solution. One municipal official described this as follows:

We were reacting to [federal and provincial government] programs and their sort of policy framework so that's why we decided to say, as a community we should probably build a strategy of our own that isn't driven by the programs but that we would have the strategy and we would have the outcomes that we want to achieve and then we'll work out all our resources with their senior level government programs or our own stuff in terms of fulfilling those outcomes and so we try to turn things around a little bit and that's why we developed Everyone has a Home.
(Municipal Official 1)

Everyone Has A Home: A Strategic Plan to Address Homelessness (2007a) was developed through city-led consultation processes lasting several years. Among its priorities were to: engage the entire community on issues related to homelessness; establish and preserve affordable housing; increase supports to help people obtain and maintain housing; increase access to adequate income; and ensure efficient and effective use of community resources. One thread running through the strategic plan was the notion that enhanced collaboration with community organizations as well as planning and consultation with affected groups would contribute to more inclusive and healthier

communities. While this sentiment was widely shared, from the City of Hamilton's perspective the value of partnership and collaboration was also in enhancing responsiveness, efficiencies and quality of service. As one municipal official put it:

The whole push for collaboration, I think that's really what we are very conscious of now. We want collaborative efforts because the more you can reach more people, it's more efficient in terms of flowing your dollars and affecting service for people. And I think it is much more comprehensive in the way that it is provided.
(Municipal Official 2)

Under SCPI/HPI, the City of Hamilton was expected to be a strategic enabler (Milligan & Fyfe, 2006) and broker these collaborations and partnerships. The real challenge for the City of Hamilton was in building project-based partnerships between community agencies, often with different missions and values, to support strategic, system-wide priorities. The strategic plan called for collaboration by community partners to expand evaluation and monitoring efforts of homelessness programming and to identify and reach chronically homeless people in the emergency shelter system. City officials cited a healthy civic culture when it came to collaboration but hinted at the need to go further.

*And I would say we have some agencies that have totally bought into collaborative effort and collaborative responses. Then we have others that are having more difficulty playing in the sandbox and at some point in time we are going to have to wrestle with that – and it's coming. It's coming to a forefront with this because what we are talking about – funding – and I would say, this is exactly where we are going to go with this funding pot – it is going to be a collaborative response and you are part of the collaborative response or you are not. You can provide whatever service you want – if you want to pay for it, go for it.
(Municipal Official 2)*

Federal and provincial funding regimes did give city officials leverage. The push for collaboration was a central component of federal programs such as SCPI and HPI and as such was a prerequisite built into the aforementioned program's funding mechanisms. In their SCPI/HPI funding applications applicants were required to specify who they were partnering with and how. Regardless, the above comments about “playing in the sandbox” hint at tensions related to the funding requirement to partner and collaborate.

The findings summarized above describe how both hard arrangements in the form of a managerial turn towards performance-orientated systems and soft arrangements in the form of a community turn towards local collaboration and partnership came together at the local level in Hamilton to create a form

of local governance we refer to as CBM. CBM was best exemplified in the service delivery framework adopted in Hamilton called the *Blueprint for Emergency Shelter Services* (City of Hamilton, 2009). This framework defined the specifications for a redesigned emergency shelter system including standardized intake procedures, common practices and protocols, information sharing and measurement of system-wide outcomes. It also established the Emergency Shelter Services Planning and Integration Committee as a structure for promoting integration and enhanced coordination. As the following quote demonstrates, the blueprint epitomized the blending of managerial and community imperatives:

*With a clear vision, a new service delivery framework and a proposed funding model, many of the critical building blocks for a sound emergency shelter system are in place. What is needed is the mortar that holds these blocks together. The firm commitment and the consistency of a unifying systems-oriented group, is essential in order to create a strong and lasting structure
(City of Hamilton, 2009: 17).*

This passage conveys how crucial community collaboration was for achieving managerial ends. From the perspective of voluntary sector organizations, however, CBM had significant impacts, which were not always positive. These are elucidated in the following section.

VOLUNTARY SECTOR TENSIONS

As previously noted, recent literatures on voluntarism have focused sustained attention on some of the tensions associated with both hard and soft institutional reforms. Many of these tensions were present in Hamilton. Three tensions in particular are described next.

First, horizontal tensions were evident within the voluntary sector as organizations were pushed to collaborate and simultaneously compete for funding. For example, one key informant shared the following:

So we're faced with a dilemma which is kind of a paradox because the government says, 'You should partner more closely with people.' And we try to do that – we meet with all these groups, women's shelter, men's shelter, etc. etc. the addiction, but as soon as you leave that building, we have to realize that we are competitors, money wise, so you have the social work side, cozying up to each other in your organization saying, 'We have to have more of a love in type of thing.' And then on the development side we have to face reality that we have to raise money to exist.

(Social Services Agency, 9)

The fact that project-based funding was contingent on collaboration led some agencies to refer to subsequent arrangements as forced partnerships. In the scramble to assemble project-funding applications, artificial partnerships were sometimes devised that more or less existed on paper for the sake of securing the funds.

Second, vertical tensions were evident between voluntary organizations and state funders. The greater emphasis on outcomes imposed additional burdens on already resource strapped agencies that now had to invest more resources into not only proposal writing but also reporting. Large agencies that had professionalized their organizations had few options other than to play the game and embrace the investment logic that was now guiding the distribution of state funding. One key informant stated:

Instead of just going, 'this is important we need to make this investment,' they want to go back with, 'this is how this investment has made a difference and we need to continue these results with more funding' (...) Just show that what you're doing is making that progress. Cut out the diatribe about you know all the social ills that are out there and just show the results and get some money there. (...) We've had to push back a little bit. Occasionally people want outcome measurement, like within eight months for people that are chronically homeless for 20 years, and like, 'okay now, come on here?'

(Social Services Agency 13)

Agencies in these situations found it necessary to invest time and resources in shaping and managing the expectations of state and community funders or to simply push back.

Third, a more complex internal tension was evident with regard to the perceived loss of the voluntary sector's traditional advocacy role, as agencies were compelled towards more professional organizational forms and more interventionist approaches. One particular example was the managerial imperative to target chronically homeless populations, a rationality that seemed to penetrate the missions of several service providers. For example, one key informant explained:

If you look at what the city is doing, is putting more emphasis on homelessness, but trying to eradicate the chronic shelter user (...) again the city and [us] are doing this, taking that individual, working with them one on one and supporting that person with everything that we can and getting that person off the street. Getting into an apartment as I said earlier or into a rooming house but not only that but helping them with the budget, with how they spend their money, with how they communicate almost on a daily basis, you know it's a one-on-one. You go to that person's apartment in the morning and say to them 'ok we need to do this today, do that today' to help them move along,
(Social Service Agency 1).

The voluntary sector, traditionally renowned for its responsiveness and its orientation towards social justice, was now expected to operate more professionally and less as the social advocates that the sector was traditionally known for. One key informant expressed this dynamic in terms of a sense of loss:

Things had changed where we were never going to be able to go back to those days of that really vibrant political activist. It was activists doing this job – this work 10, 12, 15 years ago and now it's sort of professionals and policy people and stuff (...) it is different and I'm not saying it's not effective but it's more professionals running the show now instead of community activists and I think that's how it's changed.
(Advocacy Organization 6)

The horizontal, vertical and internal tensions identified above roughly triangulate the impact of CBM at the local level. Refocusing the shelter system around financial efficiencies and targeting chronic shelter users involved changes to how local organizations related to each other and, in some cases, their own missions. Local voluntary sector organizations adapted: some worked with the system, becoming more professionalized and bureaucratic in the process, and others worked outside the system. The result was a bifurcated voluntary landscape at the local level consisting of large, professionalized, corporatist organizations closely aligned with the state and small, informal grassroots organizations operating largely on the periphery (Milligan & Fyfe, 2005).

This form of voluntary landscape should not be read as a straightforward top-down cooptation of the voluntary sector by the state (as portrayed by the shadow state concept). Local voluntary organizations did maintain some independence and community agendas were not completely lost on the state. Yet the practices and activities of some organizations were significantly reshaped by the managerial agenda of the municipal government and its desire to achieve a more sustainable approach to serving the homeless population. In this regard, CBM allowed a certain degree of freedom, in terms of what local organizations could do, but this freedom existed within certain managerial parameters (such as targeting chronic shelter users, for example).

CONCLUSION

The above case study demonstrates how the federal, provincial and municipal governments worked with and through the voluntary sector to address the crisis of homelessness in Hamilton, Ontario. In this regard, the local voluntary landscape was a critical site of investment, coordination and ultimately transformation. Without a doubt CBM, as a mode of governance, significantly reconfigured the voluntary landscape in Hamilton. The layering of soft community arrangements over top preexisting hard managerial arrangements transformed the orientation of some voluntary organizations and changed their relationship to the City of Hamilton. The resulting configuration was associated with a number of tensions traceable to competitive and performance-orientated reforms on one hand and collaborative and partnership-based imperatives on the other. These tensions are notable given the dual emphasis on cost-savings and community governance in homelessness policy.

REFERENCES

- Baines, D. (2006). Whose needs are being served? Quantitative metrics and the reshaping of public services. *Studies in Political Economy*, 77, 195–209
- City of Hamilton. (2009). *Homelessness Blueprint: Emergency Shelter Services*. Hamilton, ON: City of Hamilton.
- City of Hamilton. (2007a). *Everyone Has a Home: A Strategic Plan to Address Homelessness*. Hamilton, ON: City of Hamilton.
- City of Hamilton. (2007b). *On Any Given Night: Measuring Homelessness in Hamilton*. Hamilton, ON: City of Hamilton.
- City of Hamilton. (2004). *Keys to the Home: A Housing Strategy for Hamilton*. Hamilton, ON: City of Hamilton.
- City of Hamilton. (2003). *The Homelessness Continuum: A Community Plan for Hamilton*. Hamilton, ON: City of Hamilton
- Clarke, J. & Newman, J. (1997). *The Managerial State: Power, Politics and Ideology in the Remaking of Social Welfare*. London: Sage Publications.
- Cloutier-Fisher, D. & Skinner, M. (2006). Leveling the playing field? Exploring the implications of managed competition for voluntary sector providers of long-term care in small town Ontario. *Health and Place*, 12, 97–109.
- Coulter, K. (2009). Deep neoliberal integration: The production of Third Way politics in Ontario. *Studies in Political Economy*, 83, 191–208

- Craig, D. & Cotterell, G. (2007). Periodising Neoliberalism? *Policy & Politics*, 35(3), 497–514
- Craig, D. & Porter, D. (2005). The Third Way and the third world: poverty reduction and social inclusion strategies in the rise of ‘inclusive’ liberalism. *Review of International Political Economy*, 12(2), 226–63.
- Culhane, D. & Metraux, S. 2008. Rearranging the Deck Chairs or Reallocating the Lifeboats? Homelessness Assistance and Its Alternatives. *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 74(1), 111–121.
- Del Casino Jr. & Jocoy, C.L. (2008). Neoliberal subjectivities, the ‘new’ homelessness, and struggles over spaces of/in the city. *Antipode*, 40, 192–199.
- DeVerteuil, G. (2003). Welfare reform, institutional practices, and service delivery settings. *Urban Geography*, 24(6), 529–550.
- DeVerteuil, G., Lee, W. & Wolch, J. (2002). New spaces for the local welfare state? The case of General Relief in Los Angeles County. *Journal of Social and Cultural Geography*, 3, 229–288.
- Edwards, B. & Woods, M. (2006). Voluntarism and new forms of governance in rural Communities. In Milligan, C. & Conradson, D. (Eds.), *Landscapes of Voluntarism: New Spaces of Health, Welfare, and Governance*, (pp. 53–72). Bristol: Policy Press Pg.
- Elwood, S. (2004). Partnerships and Participation: Reconfiguring Urban Governance In Different State Contexts. *Urban Geography*, 25(8), 755–770.
- Evans, B.M. & Shields, J. (2001). The Third Sector: Neo-Liberal Restructuring, Governance, and the Remaking of State-Civil Society Relationships. In Dunn (Ed), *Handbook of Canadian Public Policy*, (pp. 139–155). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press
- Fyfe, N. (2005). Making space for ‘neocommunitarianism’? The third sector, state and civil society in the U.K. *Antipode*, 37, 536–557.
- Fyfe, N. & Milligan, C. (2003). Out of the shadows: exploring contemporary geographies of voluntarism. *Progress in Human Geography*, 27, 397–413
- Gibson, K., O’Donnell, S. & Rideout, V. (2007). The project-funding regime: Complications for community organizations and their staff. *Canadian Public Administration*, 50(3), 411–435.
- Goodwin, M. & Painter, J. (1996). Local governance, the crisis of Fordism and the changing geographies of regulation. *Transactions, Institute of British Geographers*, 21, 635–648.
- Government of Ontario. (2001). *Roles and Responsibilities – 2001: The Provincial-Municipal Relationship in Human Services*. Toronto, ON: Government of Ontario.
- Graefe, P. (2007). Social Economy Policies as Flanking Mechanism for Neo-Liberalism: Trans-national Policy Solutions, Emergent Contradictions, Local Alternatives. In Lee, S. & McBride, S. (Eds.), *Neoliberalism, State Power and Global Governance*, (pp. 95–110). New York, NY: Springer
- Graham, K., Phillips, S. & Ker, A. (2003). *Implementing the Supporting Communities Partnership Initiative through the Community Entity Municipal Model in Hamilton*. Ottawa, ON: Human Resources Development Canada.

- Graham, K. & Phillips, S. (1998). Who Does What in Ontario: The process of provincial-municipal disentanglement. *Canadian Public Administration*, 41(2), 175–209.
- Hackworth, J. (2007). *The Neoliberal City: Governance, Ideology, and Development in American Urbanism*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Halseth, G. & Ryser, L. (2007). The Deployment of Partnerships by the Voluntary Sector to Address Service Needs in Rural and Small Town Canada. *Voluntas*, 18(3), 241–265.
- Harvey, D. (2005). *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. New York: Oxford University Press
- Hulchanski, D. (2004). How did we get here? The evolution of Canada's 'exclusionary' housing system. In Hulchanski, D. & Shapcott, M. (Eds.), *Finding Room: Options for a Canadian Rental Housing Strategy*, (pp. 179–193). Toronto, ON: CUCS Press
- Jenson, J. & Saint-Martin, D. (2006). Building blocks for a new social architecture: the LEGO™ paradigm of an active society. *Policy and Politics*, 34(3), 429–451.
- Jenson, J. & Saint-Martin, D. (2003). New routes to Social Cohesion? Citizenship and the Social Investment State. *Canadian Journal of Sociology*, 28(1), 77–99.
- Jessop, B. (2002). Liberalism, Neoliberalism, and Urban Governance: A State Theoretical Perspective. *Antipode*, 34(3), 452–471.
- Jessop, B. (1999). The changing governance of welfare: Recent trends in its primary functions, scale, and modes of coordination. *Social Policy & Administration*, 33(4), 348–359.
- Jessop, B. (1998). The rise of governance and the risks of failure: the case of economic development. *International Social Science Journal*, 155, 29–46.
- Jiwani, I. (2000). Globalization at the level of the nation-state: The case of Canada's third sector. *Innovations: A Journal of Politics*, 3, 27–46.
- Kodras, J. (1997). Restructuring the state: devolution, privatization, and the geographic redistribution of power and capacity of governance. In Staeheli, L., Kodras, J. & Flint, C. (Eds.), *State Devolution in America: Implications for a Diverse Society*, (pp. 79–96). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
- Lake, R. & Newman, K. (2002). Differential citizenship in the shadow state. *Geojournal*, 58, 109–120.
- Larner, W. & Butler, M. (2007). The Places, People, and Politics of Partnership: After Neoliberalism in Aotearora New Zealand. In Leitner, H., Peck, J. & Sheppard, E. (Eds.), *Contesting Neoliberalism: Urban Frontiers*. (pg. 71–89) New York: Guilford Press.
- Larner, W. & Butler, M. (2005). Governmentalities of Local Partnerships: The Rise of A 'Partnering State' in New Zealand. *Studies in Political Economy*, 75, 79–101.
- Larner, W. & Craig, D. (2005). After neoliberalism? Community Activism and Local Partnership in New Zealand. *Antipode*, 37, 407–424.

- Larner, W. (2000). Neo-liberalism: policy, ideology, governmentality. *Studies in Political Economy*, 63, 5–25.
- Laws, G. 1992. Emergency Shelter Networks in an Urban Area: Serving the Homeless in Metropolitan Toronto. *Urban Geography*, 13(2), 99–126.
- MacMillan, R. & Townsend, A. (2006). A ‘new’ institutional fix? The ‘community turn’ and the changing role of the voluntary sector. In Milligan, C. & Conradson, D. (Eds.), *Landscapes of Voluntarism: New Spaces of Health, Welfare, and Governance*. (pp. 15–32). Bristol, UK: The Policy Press
- Mahon, R. & Macdonald, L. (2010). Anti-poverty politics in Toronto and Mexico City. *Geoforum*, 41, 209–217.
- Mahon, R. (2008). Varieties of Liberalism: Canadian Social Policy from the ‘Golden Age’ to the Present. *Social Policy & Administration*. 42(4), 342–361.
- Milligan, C. & Conradson, D. (2006). *Landscapes of Voluntarism: New Spaces of Health, Welfare, and Governance*. Bristol: Policy Press.
- Milligan, C. & Fyfe, N. (2005). Preserving Space for Volunteers: Exploring the Links between Voluntary Welfare Organizations, Volunteering and Citizenship. *Journal of Urban Studies*, 42(3), 417–434.
- Milligan, C. & Fyfe, N. (2006). Renewal or Relocation? Social welfare, voluntarism and the City. In Milligan, C. and Conradson, D. (Eds.), *Landscapes of Voluntarism: New Spaces of Health, Welfare, and Governance*. (pp. 33–52) Bristol: Policy Press.
- Mitchell, K. (2001). Transnationalism, neo-liberalism, and the rise of the shadow state. *Economy and Society*, 30(2), 165–189.
- Morrison, J. (2000). The Government-Voluntary Sector Compacts: Governance, Governmentality, and Civil Society. *Journal of Law and Society*, 27(1), 98–132.
- Phillips, S. & Levasseur, K. (2004). The snakes and ladders of accountability: Contradictions between contracting and collaboration for Canada’s voluntary sector. *Canadian Public Administration*, 47(4), 451–474.
- Phillips, S. (2004). The Limits of Horizontal Governance: Voluntary Sector-Government Collaboration in Canada. *Society and Economy*, 26(2/3), 383–405.
- Saint-Martin, D. (2004). *Coordinating Interdependence: Governance and Social Policy Redesign in Britain, the European Union and Canada*. Ottawa, Ontario: Canadian Policy Research Network.
- Skinner, M. & Rosenberg, M. (2006). Co-opting voluntarism? Exploring the implications of long-term care reform for the nonprofit sector in Ontario. *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy* 23, 101–121.
- Smith, S. & Lipsky, M. (1993). *Nonprofits for Hire: The Welfare State in the Age of Contracting*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Smith, N. (1984). *Uneven Development*. Oxford: Blackwell.

- SPRC. (2000). *The Community Action Plan on Homelessness in Hamilton-Wentworth*. Hamilton, ON: Social Planning and Research Council of Hamilton-Wentworth (SPRC).
- Trudeau, D. (2008a). Towards a relational view of the shadow state. *Political Geography*, 27, 669–690.
- Trudeau, D. (2008b). Junior Partner or Empowered Community? The Role of Non-profit Social Service Providers amidst State Restructuring in the US. *Urban Studies* 45(13), 2805–2827.
- Wolch, J. (1990). *The Shadow State: Government and the Voluntary Sector in Transition*. New York, NY: The Foundation Centre.
- Wolfe, J. & Jay, W. (1990). The Revolving Door: Third Sector Organizations and the Homeless. In Fallis, G. and Murray, A. (Eds.), *Housing the homeless: New partnerships among the private, public and third sectors*. (PP. 197–226). Toronto, ON: University of Toronto Press.
-

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Joshua Evans

Centre for Social Sciences, Faculty of Humanities & Social Sciences, Athabasca University
jevans@athabascau.ca

Joshua Evans is an assistant professor in the Centre for Social Sciences at Athabasca University. He is a social and health geography with a primary interest in housing policy, urban homelessness, and harm reduction. Joshua has published his research in journals such as *Social Science & Medicine*, *Health & Place*, and *Social & Cultural Geography*.

Robert Wilton

School of Geography & Earth Sciences, McMaster University
wiltonr@mcmaster.ca

Robert Wilton is a professor in the School of Geography and Earth Sciences at McMaster University. He is a social and health geographer with a primary interest in problems of social and spatial exclusion confronting disabled people and those dealing with addiction.